fix(thin-client): deep-build fixes + Snipe-IT/Alloy real impl

Tiefen-Validierung via 'nix build .#nixosConfigurations.AZ-TC-NN.config.
system.build.toplevel' hat mehrere reale Bugs gefunden, die 'nix flake
check' nicht sah. Alle drei Pilot-Hosts bauen jetzt sauber durch.

Gefixst:
- freerdp3 → freerdp (umbenannt in nixpkgs-unstable)
- SDDM Theme.Logo will INI-Atom (string), nicht Nix-path → '${path}'
- security.pam.mount.extraVolumes will list-of-string, nicht ein String
- sudoers: 'domain admins' muss als 'domain\ admins' escaped werden
- agenix file-Pfade: ../../secrets/ → ../../../secrets/ (Tiefe korrigiert)
- snapper: config.services.snapper.package gibt es nicht → pkgs.snapper
- samba4Full entfernt (blockiert durch ceph-common python metadata issue
  in nixpkgs-unstable; Thin Clients brauchen es nicht — cifs-utils reicht)
- corp-wifi-ca.pem durch gültiges Dummy-PEM ersetzt (openssl-generiert,
  mit明显 REPLACE-MARKER; build kann PEM parsen)

Functional gemacht:
- Alloy: echtes River-Config mit loki.source.journal + loki.write statt
  barem logging-stub. Journal-Logs mit host/unit/severity-Labels nach
  Loki.
- Snipe-IT: echte Check-in-Logik via curl + jq. Lookup by asset_tag,
  PATCH falls exists, POST falls neu. startAt täglich 03:30. API-Token
  via agenix (snipeit-api-token.age).
- node_exporter push: realer curl-Push alle 60s mit retry on failure.

Safety:
- Placeholder-Assertions in roles/thin-client/default.nix: build schlägt
  fehl, wenn wifi.ssid/hotline/company noch Placeholder sind (außer
  site='staging'). Pilot-Hosts haben site='staging' bis echte Werte da.
- assets/corp-wifi-ca.pem hat deutlich sichtbaren REPLACE-Hinweis.

Neue Options:
- az.tc.monitoring.snipeItUrl (default: snipeit.az-group.local)

Neue Secrets (Placeholder .age-Files zum Ausfüllen):
- snipeit-api-token.age (fleet-wide shared)
This commit is contained in:
m3ta-chiron
2026-07-29 09:06:12 +02:00
parent 98dc2917e8
commit 0cc0b5064d
31 changed files with 282 additions and 116 deletions
+8 -3
View File
@@ -90,12 +90,17 @@ in {
"d /etc/wifi 0700 root root -"
];
# CA cert installed system-wide as trust anchor (defensive)
security.pki.certificateFiles = [config.az.tc.wifi.caCert];
# NOTE: We intentionally do NOT add the WiFi CA to
# security.pki.certificateFiles here — that would force it into the
# system trust store at build time, which fails if the placeholder
# PEM hasn't been replaced yet. NetworkManager references the CA
# directly via the `ca-cert=` key in the .nmconnection profile, which
# is sufficient for 802.1X EAP-TLS. Replace the placeholder PEM with
# the real AD CS root cert before deploying.
# Per-host client cert (via agenix)
age.secrets."${hostname}-wifi-client-cert" = {
file = ../../secrets/${hostname}-wifi-client-cert.age;
file = ../../../secrets/${hostname}-wifi-client-cert.age;
path = "/etc/wifi/client.pem";
mode = "0600";
owner = "root";