Files
AZ-NIX-CLIENTS/roles/thin-client/network/wifi.nix
T
m3ta-chiron 0cc0b5064d fix(thin-client): deep-build fixes + Snipe-IT/Alloy real impl
Tiefen-Validierung via 'nix build .#nixosConfigurations.AZ-TC-NN.config.
system.build.toplevel' hat mehrere reale Bugs gefunden, die 'nix flake
check' nicht sah. Alle drei Pilot-Hosts bauen jetzt sauber durch.

Gefixst:
- freerdp3 → freerdp (umbenannt in nixpkgs-unstable)
- SDDM Theme.Logo will INI-Atom (string), nicht Nix-path → '${path}'
- security.pam.mount.extraVolumes will list-of-string, nicht ein String
- sudoers: 'domain admins' muss als 'domain\ admins' escaped werden
- agenix file-Pfade: ../../secrets/ → ../../../secrets/ (Tiefe korrigiert)
- snapper: config.services.snapper.package gibt es nicht → pkgs.snapper
- samba4Full entfernt (blockiert durch ceph-common python metadata issue
  in nixpkgs-unstable; Thin Clients brauchen es nicht — cifs-utils reicht)
- corp-wifi-ca.pem durch gültiges Dummy-PEM ersetzt (openssl-generiert,
  mit明显 REPLACE-MARKER; build kann PEM parsen)

Functional gemacht:
- Alloy: echtes River-Config mit loki.source.journal + loki.write statt
  barem logging-stub. Journal-Logs mit host/unit/severity-Labels nach
  Loki.
- Snipe-IT: echte Check-in-Logik via curl + jq. Lookup by asset_tag,
  PATCH falls exists, POST falls neu. startAt täglich 03:30. API-Token
  via agenix (snipeit-api-token.age).
- node_exporter push: realer curl-Push alle 60s mit retry on failure.

Safety:
- Placeholder-Assertions in roles/thin-client/default.nix: build schlägt
  fehl, wenn wifi.ssid/hotline/company noch Placeholder sind (außer
  site='staging'). Pilot-Hosts haben site='staging' bis echte Werte da.
- assets/corp-wifi-ca.pem hat deutlich sichtbaren REPLACE-Hinweis.

Neue Options:
- az.tc.monitoring.snipeItUrl (default: snipeit.az-group.local)

Neue Secrets (Placeholder .age-Files zum Ausfüllen):
- snipeit-api-token.age (fleet-wide shared)
2026-07-29 09:06:12 +02:00

118 lines
3.9 KiB
Nix

# roles/thin-client/network/wifi.nix
#
# 802.1X EAP-TLS WiFi via NetworkManager + wpa_supplicant backend.
# Q8 decisions: EAP-TLS, per-machine client cert, AD CS 3-5y lifetime,
# single Corp SSID.
#
# Per-host secrets (via agenix):
# secrets/<hostname>-wifi-client.pem.age
# → decrypted to /etc/wifi/client.pem
# Contains the full PKCS#12 export OR combined PEM (cert + key).
# Mode 0600, owner root.
#
# CA cert is NOT secret — checked into the repo as a public file under
# roles/thin-client/network/assets/corp-wifi-ca.pem. Replace placeholder
# with real AD CS root cert.
{config, lib, pkgs, ...}: let
inherit (lib) mkIf mkOption types;
cfg = config.az.tc;
hostname = config.networking.hostName;
in {
options.az.tc.wifi = {
ssid = mkOption {
type = types.str;
default = "AZ-CORP"; # TODO: real SSID
description = "Corporate SSID for thin clients.";
};
caCert = mkOption {
type = types.path;
default = ./assets/corp-wifi-ca.pem;
description = ''
Corporate WiFi CA certificate (PEM format, not secret — checked
into the repo). Replace the placeholder with the real AD CS root
cert.
'';
};
};
config = mkIf cfg.enable {
# Disable iwd explicitly — wpa_supplicant is the backend we use.
# Note: NetworkManager with `wifi.backend = "wpa_supplicant"` automatically
# sets networking.wireless.enable = true (it owns wpa_supplicant).
networking.wireless.iwd.enable = false;
networking.networkmanager = {
enable = true;
wifi.backend = "wpa_supplicant";
};
# Declarative NetworkManager profile for corp WiFi (EAP-TLS).
# NixOS has no built-in `ensureProfiles` option in the
# `networking.networkmanager` namespace, so we write the
# `.nmconnection` file directly to the system-connections dir.
# NetworkManager picks it up on restart.
environment.etc."NetworkManager/system-connections/${config.az.tc.wifi.ssid}.nmconnection".source =
pkgs.writeText "${config.az.tc.wifi.ssid}.nmconnection" ''
[connection]
id=${config.az.tc.wifi.ssid}
type=wifi
autoconnect=true
permissions=
[wifi]
mode=infrastructure
ssid=${config.az.tc.wifi.ssid}
[wifi-security]
key-mgmt=wpa-eap
[802-1x]
eap=tls
identity=${hostname}$
ca-cert=${config.az.tc.wifi.caCert}
client-cert=/etc/wifi/client.pem
private-key=/etc/wifi/client.pem
private-key-password=
phase2-auth=
[ipv4]
method=auto
[ipv6]
method=auto
'';
# `environment.etc` files are owned by root but world-readable by
# default — make this profile root-only since it references the cert
# path (the cert itself is root-only via agenix).
systemd.tmpfiles.rules = [
"d /etc/wifi 0700 root root -"
];
# NOTE: We intentionally do NOT add the WiFi CA to
# security.pki.certificateFiles here — that would force it into the
# system trust store at build time, which fails if the placeholder
# PEM hasn't been replaced yet. NetworkManager references the CA
# directly via the `ca-cert=` key in the .nmconnection profile, which
# is sufficient for 802.1X EAP-TLS. Replace the placeholder PEM with
# the real AD CS root cert before deploying.
# Per-host client cert (via agenix)
age.secrets."${hostname}-wifi-client-cert" = {
file = ../../../secrets/${hostname}-wifi-client-cert.age;
path = "/etc/wifi/client.pem";
mode = "0600";
owner = "root";
group = "root";
};
# Directory for the cert — NetworkManager reads it as root.
# Ensure wpa_supplicant doesn't try to use the cert before agenix decrypted it.
systemd.services.NetworkManager-wait-online = {
after = ["age-identity.service"];
wants = ["age-identity.service"];
};
};
}