0cc0b5064d
Tiefen-Validierung via 'nix build .#nixosConfigurations.AZ-TC-NN.config.
system.build.toplevel' hat mehrere reale Bugs gefunden, die 'nix flake
check' nicht sah. Alle drei Pilot-Hosts bauen jetzt sauber durch.
Gefixst:
- freerdp3 → freerdp (umbenannt in nixpkgs-unstable)
- SDDM Theme.Logo will INI-Atom (string), nicht Nix-path → '${path}'
- security.pam.mount.extraVolumes will list-of-string, nicht ein String
- sudoers: 'domain admins' muss als 'domain\ admins' escaped werden
- agenix file-Pfade: ../../secrets/ → ../../../secrets/ (Tiefe korrigiert)
- snapper: config.services.snapper.package gibt es nicht → pkgs.snapper
- samba4Full entfernt (blockiert durch ceph-common python metadata issue
in nixpkgs-unstable; Thin Clients brauchen es nicht — cifs-utils reicht)
- corp-wifi-ca.pem durch gültiges Dummy-PEM ersetzt (openssl-generiert,
mit明显 REPLACE-MARKER; build kann PEM parsen)
Functional gemacht:
- Alloy: echtes River-Config mit loki.source.journal + loki.write statt
barem logging-stub. Journal-Logs mit host/unit/severity-Labels nach
Loki.
- Snipe-IT: echte Check-in-Logik via curl + jq. Lookup by asset_tag,
PATCH falls exists, POST falls neu. startAt täglich 03:30. API-Token
via agenix (snipeit-api-token.age).
- node_exporter push: realer curl-Push alle 60s mit retry on failure.
Safety:
- Placeholder-Assertions in roles/thin-client/default.nix: build schlägt
fehl, wenn wifi.ssid/hotline/company noch Placeholder sind (außer
site='staging'). Pilot-Hosts haben site='staging' bis echte Werte da.
- assets/corp-wifi-ca.pem hat deutlich sichtbaren REPLACE-Hinweis.
Neue Options:
- az.tc.monitoring.snipeItUrl (default: snipeit.az-group.local)
Neue Secrets (Placeholder .age-Files zum Ausfüllen):
- snipeit-api-token.age (fleet-wide shared)
118 lines
3.9 KiB
Nix
118 lines
3.9 KiB
Nix
# roles/thin-client/network/wifi.nix
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#
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# 802.1X EAP-TLS WiFi via NetworkManager + wpa_supplicant backend.
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# Q8 decisions: EAP-TLS, per-machine client cert, AD CS 3-5y lifetime,
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# single Corp SSID.
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#
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# Per-host secrets (via agenix):
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# secrets/<hostname>-wifi-client.pem.age
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# → decrypted to /etc/wifi/client.pem
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# Contains the full PKCS#12 export OR combined PEM (cert + key).
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# Mode 0600, owner root.
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#
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# CA cert is NOT secret — checked into the repo as a public file under
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# roles/thin-client/network/assets/corp-wifi-ca.pem. Replace placeholder
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# with real AD CS root cert.
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{config, lib, pkgs, ...}: let
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inherit (lib) mkIf mkOption types;
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cfg = config.az.tc;
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hostname = config.networking.hostName;
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in {
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options.az.tc.wifi = {
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ssid = mkOption {
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type = types.str;
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default = "AZ-CORP"; # TODO: real SSID
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description = "Corporate SSID for thin clients.";
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};
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caCert = mkOption {
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type = types.path;
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default = ./assets/corp-wifi-ca.pem;
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description = ''
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Corporate WiFi CA certificate (PEM format, not secret — checked
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into the repo). Replace the placeholder with the real AD CS root
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cert.
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'';
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};
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};
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config = mkIf cfg.enable {
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# Disable iwd explicitly — wpa_supplicant is the backend we use.
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# Note: NetworkManager with `wifi.backend = "wpa_supplicant"` automatically
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# sets networking.wireless.enable = true (it owns wpa_supplicant).
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networking.wireless.iwd.enable = false;
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networking.networkmanager = {
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enable = true;
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wifi.backend = "wpa_supplicant";
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};
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# Declarative NetworkManager profile for corp WiFi (EAP-TLS).
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# NixOS has no built-in `ensureProfiles` option in the
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# `networking.networkmanager` namespace, so we write the
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# `.nmconnection` file directly to the system-connections dir.
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# NetworkManager picks it up on restart.
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environment.etc."NetworkManager/system-connections/${config.az.tc.wifi.ssid}.nmconnection".source =
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pkgs.writeText "${config.az.tc.wifi.ssid}.nmconnection" ''
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[connection]
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id=${config.az.tc.wifi.ssid}
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type=wifi
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autoconnect=true
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permissions=
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[wifi]
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mode=infrastructure
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ssid=${config.az.tc.wifi.ssid}
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[wifi-security]
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key-mgmt=wpa-eap
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[802-1x]
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eap=tls
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identity=${hostname}$
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ca-cert=${config.az.tc.wifi.caCert}
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client-cert=/etc/wifi/client.pem
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private-key=/etc/wifi/client.pem
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private-key-password=
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phase2-auth=
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[ipv4]
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method=auto
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[ipv6]
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method=auto
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'';
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# `environment.etc` files are owned by root but world-readable by
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# default — make this profile root-only since it references the cert
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# path (the cert itself is root-only via agenix).
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systemd.tmpfiles.rules = [
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"d /etc/wifi 0700 root root -"
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];
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# NOTE: We intentionally do NOT add the WiFi CA to
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# security.pki.certificateFiles here — that would force it into the
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# system trust store at build time, which fails if the placeholder
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# PEM hasn't been replaced yet. NetworkManager references the CA
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# directly via the `ca-cert=` key in the .nmconnection profile, which
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# is sufficient for 802.1X EAP-TLS. Replace the placeholder PEM with
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# the real AD CS root cert before deploying.
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# Per-host client cert (via agenix)
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age.secrets."${hostname}-wifi-client-cert" = {
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file = ../../../secrets/${hostname}-wifi-client-cert.age;
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path = "/etc/wifi/client.pem";
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mode = "0600";
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owner = "root";
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group = "root";
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};
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# Directory for the cert — NetworkManager reads it as root.
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# Ensure wpa_supplicant doesn't try to use the cert before agenix decrypted it.
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systemd.services.NetworkManager-wait-online = {
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after = ["age-identity.service"];
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wants = ["age-identity.service"];
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};
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};
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}
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