m3ta-chiron
0cc0b5064d
Tiefen-Validierung via 'nix build .#nixosConfigurations.AZ-TC-NN.config.
system.build.toplevel' hat mehrere reale Bugs gefunden, die 'nix flake
check' nicht sah. Alle drei Pilot-Hosts bauen jetzt sauber durch.
Gefixst:
- freerdp3 → freerdp (umbenannt in nixpkgs-unstable)
- SDDM Theme.Logo will INI-Atom (string), nicht Nix-path → '${path}'
- security.pam.mount.extraVolumes will list-of-string, nicht ein String
- sudoers: 'domain admins' muss als 'domain\ admins' escaped werden
- agenix file-Pfade: ../../secrets/ → ../../../secrets/ (Tiefe korrigiert)
- snapper: config.services.snapper.package gibt es nicht → pkgs.snapper
- samba4Full entfernt (blockiert durch ceph-common python metadata issue
in nixpkgs-unstable; Thin Clients brauchen es nicht — cifs-utils reicht)
- corp-wifi-ca.pem durch gültiges Dummy-PEM ersetzt (openssl-generiert,
mit明显 REPLACE-MARKER; build kann PEM parsen)
Functional gemacht:
- Alloy: echtes River-Config mit loki.source.journal + loki.write statt
barem logging-stub. Journal-Logs mit host/unit/severity-Labels nach
Loki.
- Snipe-IT: echte Check-in-Logik via curl + jq. Lookup by asset_tag,
PATCH falls exists, POST falls neu. startAt täglich 03:30. API-Token
via agenix (snipeit-api-token.age).
- node_exporter push: realer curl-Push alle 60s mit retry on failure.
Safety:
- Placeholder-Assertions in roles/thin-client/default.nix: build schlägt
fehl, wenn wifi.ssid/hotline/company noch Placeholder sind (außer
site='staging'). Pilot-Hosts haben site='staging' bis echte Werte da.
- assets/corp-wifi-ca.pem hat deutlich sichtbaren REPLACE-Hinweis.
Neue Options:
- az.tc.monitoring.snipeItUrl (default: snipeit.az-group.local)
Neue Secrets (Placeholder .age-Files zum Ausfüllen):
- snipeit-api-token.age (fleet-wide shared)
35 lines
2.2 KiB
Plaintext
35 lines
2.2 KiB
Plaintext
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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MIIDpTCCAo2gAwIBAgIUXpLpz2HAOH6Ts25kDS2ESUDavy0wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL
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BQAwYjE8MDoGA1UEAwwzQVotTklYLUNMSUVOVFMgcGxhY2Vob2xkZXIgQ0EgUkVQ
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TEFDRSBCRUZPUkUgREVQTE9ZMRUwEwYDVQQKDAxBekludGVjIEdtYkgxCzAJBgNV
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BAsMAklUMB4XDTI2MDcyOTA2NDIxN1oXDTM2MDcyNjA2NDIxN1owYjE8MDoGA1UE
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AwwzQVotTklYLUNMSUVOVFMgcGxhY2Vob2xkZXIgQ0EgUkVQTEFDRSBCRUZPUkUg
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REVQTE9ZMRUwEwYDVQQKDAxBekludGVjIEdtYkgxCzAJBgNVBAsMAklUMIIBIjAN
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BgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAubFUzQHuTkl6QbLowpwmhnTOxV0O
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BCqlgxk3Ot5wSAE7RTJ2iHw3rGoSypZge4XekLLKuIw9YipjhZMSn1twP6dBV656
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syNFnEc6NEAnvwm+j7XtRwLSeeLywEIEVrelVxwMwzqxSFJzt/N12krQLG/WY85c
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nSjy5FVoGOybxHZyrW2eilkp/0zXlOylG0GHUNIDcTzyy83pAHQCEE4L+pIVAHOO
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L3rtOrwIk/5foS+h423Gb+ik/TiqyzMBq9uWq//AeTutbniK0z5kTq2l1sNcDoYB
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i8AijDehBcTv4xsHnki+xeEBikUB7tjzsJ3/J6aKFaoPC/roT4B3rOfT9QIDAQAB
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o1MwUTAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUfjQZj2ntz7S9BmfwdIz30EBJOEYwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAU
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fjQZj2ntz7S9BmfwdIz30EBJOEYwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zANBgkqhkiG9w0B
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AQsFAAOCAQEAI8Yy9RBYnOiTcttfrJAQtmr7vExkmmPgdPwbVwjlLTysrbzcWeb8
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cT3GDn+zyvBjnKNQAq0D8vp0l2oF9+BytTXKf/Ff2rfzgYOp4rnA3j6e7AMKxUZL
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5ZEHA4iEORxxS8M/uxJN8xdjoirGb0rn0jdj3V71fxQOJ82WL0r1jfrcxyk8EPDi
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Cbe8q5s0IJsaVLgFGGNEu/RwPIFkg4tZ5+PZeWX5ZGH9roQ78VzSsNO+AHIO0QO0
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DIompYk1V6JiswlBDk+0MqQ8gt/jZFtW7Dc8+5k5zarhCEmlkk9QBzGA6Rse33bQ
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1yLgSNm/KqNDysGZGFFB7Gih8IA/lrjivQ==
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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# This is a PLACEHOLDER certificate generated by the build setup.
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# Replace this file with the real AD CS root certificate (PEM-encoded)
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# before deploying any thin client to production.
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#
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# To obtain: export the "Root CA" certificate from AD CS (certlm.msc →
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# Trusted Root Certification Authorities → Certificates → right-click →
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# All Tasks → Export → Base-64 encoded X.509 (.CER)).
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# This file is NOT secret — it's a public trust anchor. Committing it
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# to the repo is fine.
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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